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Abstract
We aimed to investigate whether action dynamics could be employed as an objective mea-
sure of decision certainty and the relationship between certainty and confidence. Twenty-
eight participants were required to view a random dot kinematogram display and report
the dominant dot direction by moving the computer mouse. Directly following this, they
were required to report the amount of points they were willing to bet that the answer they
gave was the correct one. Coherence of the stimulus was experimentally manipulated and
participants were required to complete 11 experimental blocks, each containing 48 trials of
varying dot coherence. Mouse trajectory information was not predictive of post-decision
certainty but was strongly related to decision accuracy. The findings were in line with
a view of confidence as an evaluation of evidence which continues to accumulate after a
decision.
Typically in our day to day lives, as we make a judgement or decision, it is followed by
a subjective sense of certainty that the right decision was made. This feeling of certainty
in our choices is commonly termed decision confidence. In the context of perceptual
decision making, two current accounts suggest different mechanisms behind formation
of confidence. Van den Berg et al. (2016) argue that confidence arises from the same
evidence accumulation mechanism that underlies the formation of the original decision.
In contrast, Murphy et al. (2015) propose that confidence is a product of a higher-order
meta-cognitive process evaluating evidence beyond the initial decision. Most recently,
Fleming and Daw (2017) proposed a model of second-order decision confidence, which
generalizes and unifies these two approaches.
The current study investigated whether characteristics of participants hand move-
ments can act as an objective measure of on-line decision confidence. Comparing this
measure to both performance accuracy and subjective confidence reports provides further
insight into the process underlying retrospective confidence. Participants were required
to make a perceptual discrimination task under differing levels of certainty and subse-
quently supply a measure of post hoc confidence. While previous research has often
looked exclusively at associations between performance on a task and subsequent confi-
dence judgements, the current study looks at associations between performance accuracy,
confidence reports, and response trajectories. In this way, this research aims to provide
another layer of evidence to the debates on the nature of decision confidence.
Methods
Undergraduate psychology students (N = 28, 4 male, 24 female, mean age 19.6 years)
completed an experimental session in exchange for course credit. All study procedures
Fig. 1. Experimental setup: response screen during initial decision (left panel) and gamble
selection (right panel)
employed were approved by the Research Ethics Committee at the National University
of Ireland, Galway.
Participants made a series of 528 perceptual decisions, each followed by a “gamble”.
On each trial, participants were asked to judge the prevalent direction of a random dot
kinematogram (RDK). The dot generation algorithm employed in this study was based
on that of Shadlen and Newsome (2001) and programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007).
The participants indicated their choice by moving the mouse cursor from the starting
position at the bottom centre and clicking on one of the response locations in the top
corners of the screen (Fig. 1). The RDK stimulus was present on the screen until one of
the response locations was selected. Mouse coordinates during the response were recorded
at 60Hz.
Motion coherence (the probability of any particular dot being displaced in the
stimulus direction) constituted one independent variable and was manipulated within
participants. The experimental session required participants to complete 11 trial blocks,
each consisting of 48 trials. There were four coherence levels presented within each block
(0.032, 0.064, 0.128, 0.256). All experimental blocks contained 12 trials of each coherence
level, randomly shuﬄed, with stimulus direction (left or right) randomly determined for
each trial.
On choosing a direction, participants were required to gamble 10 to 50 points on
their answer using a drop-down menu. If the correct direction was chosen, a participant
gained the chosen points, and if they chose the incorrect direction, the same number of
points was deducted from their accumulated score. Participants were told at the beginning
of the experiment that the aim was to earn as many points as possible by the end of the
session. Upon making a number selection, a feedback stimulus appeared on the screen
informing subjects whether they had answered correctly and the number of points won
or lost.
Results and Discussion
The present analysis excludes the participants who could not perform the task accurately
enough. Specifically, we excluded 12 participants who had accuracy below 75% at the
coherence level of 0.256 and/or accuracy below 65% at the 0.128 coherence level.
The rest of the participants (N = 16), as expected, were more likely to correctly
discriminate the direction of the RDK stimulus with increasing coherence (Fig. 2). In
approximately 50% of the trials, the mouse trajectories indicated that the participants
changed their preference during the course of the trial. Such trials were labelled as
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Fig. 2. Psychometric functions (averaged across 16 participants) for change-of-mind and
non-change-of-mind trials.
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Fig. 3. Gamble value (z-scored), response time (log-scaled), and mouse trajectory curva-
ture (z-scored) as a function of coherence for correct and incorrect trials. Correct responses
are depicted in green and incorrect responses in grey. Whiskers denote bootstrapped 95%
confidence intervals.
changes-of-mind. In accordance with the previous studies (e.g., Resulaj et al., 2009),
changes-of-mind improved accuracy (Fig. 2). This might reflect the fact that after initial
decision, additional evidence was continuously available to the participants until they
clicked on one of the response locations.
The amount of points gambled after each decision increased with coherence for
correct trials (Fig. 3, left panel). For incorrect trials, the amount gambled remained
consistently small across coherence levels, which indicates that the participants could
reliably detect their erroneous responses post-decision when the stimulus coherence was
high (0.128 or 0.256). Together, these patterns suggest that gambled amount reflects
subjective post-decision confidence of decision makers.
Previously in the mouse-tracking literature on value-based decision-making it has
been suggested that mouse trajectories are linked to relative subjective value of the avail-
able options (e.g., McKinstry et al., 2008; Dshemuchadse et al., 2013; O’Hora et al., 2016).
Here we hypothesize that in perceptual decision making, mouse trajectories may provide
a measure of confidence within the response. To this end, we analyse response time and
trajectory curvature as a function of RDK coherence.
As expected, response time decreased with coherence for correct responses (Fig. 3,
centre panel). Error response time tended to remain high for all coherence levels. This
is in line with consistently high values of gamble value, and thus reinforces the view of
response times being related to decision confidence.
To measure trajectory curvature, we calculated maximum deviation (max-d) of
each trajectory from the shortest trajectory towards the corresponding response area. In
correct trials, max-d for correct trials exhibited non-monotonic relationship with coherence
(Fig. 3, right panel). Although one might expect trajectory curvature to decrease as
coherence increased (that is, as decisions became easier), mean max-d initially increased
as coherence increased from 0.032 to 0.064. When coherence increased further to 0.128
and then 0.256, mean max-d decreased, in line with the expected pattern. As higher
values of max-d in the present paradigm indicate greater rate of changes-of-mind, this
finding is consistent with the post-decision evidence accumulation account of changes-of-
mind (Resulaj et al., 2009).
Overall, our results suggest that changes of response direction during motor execu-
tion of a decision are informed by late-coming signal rather than by noise in the stimulus.
Moreover, decision confidence as reflected in post-decisional wagering is related, but not
equivalent to curvature of the response trajectories. Further investigations will shed light
on the nature of relationship between within- and post-decision confidence.
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